

3 January 1964

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# WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of 1200 EST, 2 January 1964)

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
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The Communist World

**KHRUSHCHEV'S TRAVEL PLANS FOR 1964**

Khrushchev has only one announced commitment for foreign travel during 1964--a visit to Scandinavia in June. He is expected in Denmark in the middle of that month and will go on to Sweden and Norway in that order. It is anticipated that he will spend five days in each country. The counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen recently told US Embassy officials that Khrushchev would also make a stopover in Finland en route back to Moscow.

During Castro's visit to the USSR last spring, Khrushchev promised to visit Cuba, but set no firm date. There had been reports that he would go to Cuba at the beginning of the year to take part in celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the Cuban revolution, but presidium member Podgorny is already in Havana leading the USSR's delegation to the Cuban celebration. Khrushchev may have decided to put off a Cuban visit until he has more time to assess the attitude of the new US administration toward the Castro regime as well as the prospects for further improvement in Soviet-US relations.

In place of a Cuban visit, Khrushchev may be planning vis-

its to Africa and possibly Asia 25X1  
in the next few months, partly  
to undercut Chou En-lai's current  
tour.

Khrushchev  
may visit the UAR in late Janu-  
ary. This visit, however, has  
not yet been publicly announced  
by either Moscow or Cairo.

There also have been reports  
that Khrushchev plans to under-  
take an Asian tour within the 25X1  
next few months. He has accepted  
invitations from Ceylon and  
Nepal

Khrushchev may visit India in  
January or February. He has  
reportedly been angling for an  
invitation to stop in Karachi  
during his proposed trip through  
South Asia.

Khrushchev probably views  
such "good-will" tours as the  
most direct and effective means  
of competing with Peiping for  
influence in Afro-Asia. The  
heavy publicity attending such  
visits, moreover, would give  
an appearance of activity and  
forward motion in Soviet for-  
eign policy at a time when Mos-  
cow sees few prospects for sig-  
nificant advances on major East-  
West issues.

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The Communist World

THE BERLIN SITUATION

East Germany, exploiting the interest of West Berlin Mayor Brandt in continued access to East Berlin for West Berliners, is trying to raise the level of negotiations by calling for talks with plenipotentiary representatives of the West Berlin administration.

The East Germans have proposed wider negotiations "on all problems connected with the normalization of relations between the GDR and West Berlin with clearly authorized representatives of the Senat, on the basis of legal equality." Any West Berlin participation in such formal talks would tend to vitiate the Western powers' assertion of Allied rights regarding the city's special status and bolster the Communist contention that West Berlin, like East and West Germany, is an independent entity.

The record of "technical level" contact between West Berlin Senat representative Korber and East German State Secretary Wendt is being construed in East German propaganda as state-to-state contact between West Berlin and the GDR, independent of either Bonn or the Western Allies. Pravda and Neues Deutschland are publicizing the East German bid for broader negotiations in an effort to stimulate public pressure on the Senat for such talks.

The same goal underlies East Germany's liberal grants of Christmas passes and its relaxed handling of West Berliners in East Berlin. Soviet propaganda cites these passes and other re-


sults of the "technical level" talks as "convincing proof" of the benefits to be obtained from talks between East and West Germany on matters of mutual interest.

The Communists also are stepping up their wooing of West German journalists, with a view to securing a wider hearing. The editor of the Cologne Revue is reportedly leaving for Moscow and East Berlin, lured by the hope of interviewing Khrushchev and possibly GDR Foreign Minister Bolz. Some 30-50 other West German journalists have been invited to visit the GDR on guided tours which will include interviews with prominent personalities.

Top West Berlin officials have publicly indicated their readiness to undertake further negotiations on travel rights after they have had a short time to assess the effect of the present agreement.

West German Foreign Ministry officials have noted that because of the emotional pressures of the moment, and for lack of sufficient coordination by Berlin with Bonn, they were required to accede to certain objectionable facets of the original Christmas visit agreement. In principle, however, Erhard apparently does not oppose arrangements for expanded contacts with East Berlin and East Germany, although he warned in a press conference against "complications" if West Berlin city officials attempted to assume responsibilities for negotiating such arrangements.

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SOFIA, August 1962: Bulgarian policeman watches groups attracted by USIA window displays at American Legation. 6312 31 B

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The Communist World

**BULGARIAN-US RELATIONS**

Although the Bulgarian regime apparently does not wish a serious deterioration of relations, it is using the trial of the alleged US intelligence agent, Assen Georgiev, to combat the friendliness toward the US revealed by the assassination of President Kennedy.

The mob which staged the "spontaneous" demonstration in front of the US Legation on 27 December to show "outrage" over the espionage accusation had no dominant age group, but regime propaganda stressed that it was made up of "youths." This is probably an attempt to counter the fact that the 18-to-30 age group predominated in the large numbers of Bulgarians who had visited the legation to offer condolences after President Kennedy's death.

The Bulgarians also are seeking to use the demonstration to eliminate the legation's major point of contact with the Bulgarian people. In a note handed to the US chargé d'affaires on 27 December, the regime proposed that the legation close its USIA window displays to avoid "inciting" Bulgarians to new demonstrations which could "handicap the safeguard" of the legation. Upon questioning, the Bulgarian

deputy foreign minister added that the closing should be permanent, claiming that such display windows do not constitute "normal diplomatic activity."

On 29 December, Bulgarian TV accused the legation's consular officer, Mr. Blackshear, of seeking a clandestine meeting with Georgiev in late October, but later in the program, a security officer admitted that the evidence was circumstantial. The Bulgarians have refrained from implicating other US diplomatic officers. Press treatment of the US, particularly in the party newspaper, has been relatively restrained. Right up to the opening of the trial, regime officials continued to express interest in undertaking new cultural and economic projects with the US. The trial apparently was timed to coincide with the absence on home leave of Minister Anderson, who is personally linked with the improvement in US-Bulgarian relations over the past year. Charges of espionage against former US Minister Heath in the course of the Kostov trial in 1949 were a major cause of the rupture in diplomatic relations in early 1950.



GEORGIEV

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The Communist World

MONGOLIAN PARTY PURGE

The purge last week of the number-two man in the Mongolian Communist Party, L. Tsend, probably reflects a continuing effort by the dominant pro-Soviet group, led by party chief Tsedenbal, to rid the party of nationalist elements. The formal charges against Tsend were excessive personal ambition and fomenting "dirty leadership intrigues." His real offense, however, was probably that he had reservations about Mongolia's total subservience to the USSR.

There is no evidence that Tsend was pro-Chinese or was trying to increase Chinese influence in Ulan Bator in order to weaken the Soviet position. Tsend appears to have been slipping for several months. When he visited Moscow in September, no high-ranking Soviet officials attended a banquet in his honor. In November he was relieved of his post as head of

the Mongolian Soviet friendship society.

Aversion to Ulan Bator's unquestioning allegiance to Moscow apparently has led to the growth within the Mongolian party of a nationalist faction. Nationalism was involved in the ouster last year of another politburo member who had questioned Tsedenbal's policies and allegedly plotted against him.

The Nationalists may consider the increasing role of CEMA in Mongolian economic planning an infringement of Mongolia's independence. Despite the surfacing of some nationalistic sentiments, however, general recognition within the party that the realization of Mongolia's economic development plans depends on Soviet aid will probably keep the growth of nationalism within controllable limits.

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Asia-Africa

**TENSION REMAINS HIGH IN CYPRUS**

The cease-fire has become largely effective, but Ankara has moved military forces into the area near Cyprus, and Greek armed forces are on a limited alert.

Only isolated acts of violence have occurred between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in recent days. Life in the Greek sector of Nicosia is rapidly returning to normal, but the Turkish quarter still has the look of a beleaguered city, with only British patrols and press correspondents passing into and out of the area. British patrols have occupied a neutral zone between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot irregulars. Several hundred hostages held by the two communities were exchanged on 31 December.

The British commander of the British-Greek-Turkish military command in Cyprus has not yet succeeded in instituting effective patrols made up of troops from the three countries. The British also have not yet been able to secure the withdrawal of the troops from the Turkish garrison on Cyprus who moved into the Turkish quarter of Nicosia on 25 December at the height of the intercommunal fighting. A small contingent of Greek troops remains facing these Turkish forces, refusing to return to barracks until the Turks return to theirs.

Turkey continues to keep its armed forces on alert and

to assemble army, navy and air units in the Iskenderun-Mersin area.

On 1 January, the Turkish Government proposed to Athens and London that additional Turkish and Greek troops be sent to Cyprus. The British previously have opposed such a move because of the danger that incidents involving such troops would increase the risk of a direct confrontation between Greece and Turkey.

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Turkish Cypriot leaders insist that the recent violence proves coexistence with Greek Cypriots is impossible. They are renewing demands that the island be partitioned. While Ankara has not yet taken an official stand on this proposal, one Turkish official has stated that "for all practical purposes" his government no longer recognizes the Makarios administration and wants the tripartite control to continue until a new form of administration is set up.

Greek Cypriot leaders now are calling for a settlement involving majority rule, guarantees for the minority, and severance of all special ties with Turkey and Greece.

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Asia-Africa

**DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

Viet Cong activity, particularly terrorism and harassment, increased slightly during the Christmas week for the first time in five weeks. The comparatively low level of Viet Cong attacks during December and the almost total absence of larger scale attacks suggest that Communist forces may be either recuperating from their extremely high rate of military activity in November or conserving their efforts for a future step-up, or both.

Recent Viet Cong prisoner and defector interrogations have revealed evidence of the infiltration of an additional 795 persons from North Vietnam, bringing the total known infiltration during 1963 to some 1,750. They infiltrated in groups of from 30 to more than 100 after receiving special military and political training in North Vietnam. One group reportedly spent six months training in use of heavy machine guns against ground and air targets. Some of the groups apparently were destined to help form new Viet Cong battalions in the South.

Information on infiltrations is fragmentary and delayed. The total infiltrations in 1963 could have been substantially more than 1,750.

South Vietnamese Government troops have recently scored some successes, resulting in the capture of relatively large quantities of bloc-made equipment. Four antiaircraft machine guns have been seized, and a large Communist supply depot south of Saigon yielded almost 300,000

rounds of ammunition, much of it of Chinese Communist manufacture. The seven tons of materiel included two Chinese-type carbines, a Chinese-made rocket launcher and two new 60-mm. mortars, apparently of Chinese Communist manufacture. The seized depot is in an area where security has recently deteriorated. The incident points up the significant contribution of external support to the improved Viet Cong firepower.

There was a generally favorable public response to the personal appearance of Saigon's junta leader, General Minh, at a ceremony organized on 28 December by members of the Cao Dai politico-religious sect in support of the new government, according to the US Embassy in Saigon.

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This week's conference called to unify all Buddhist sects in the country may shed some light on the political intentions of various Buddhist leaders. The Buddhists have maintained a reserve toward the new government, which has not yet satisfied their request for military chaplains or repealed legal restrictions on their property rights. At the same time, the Buddhists reportedly have embarked on a large-scale effort to organize their followers in the villages.

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Asia-Africa

**SIHANOUK'S LATEST MOVES IN CAMBODIA**

Prince Sihanouk appears to be working to ease tensions with South Vietnam while he maintains his hard line toward the United States and continues to plump for an international conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality.

A round of talks between Cambodian and South Vietnamese officials has accomplished little but has at least been cordial. Sihanouk has dropped his charges that South Vietnam is harboring Cambodian dissidents who have been making broadcasts critical of his rule. Although Saigon formally rejected his neutrality conference proposal, his response was restrained. The appointment of the son of one of Sihanouk's long-standing enemies to South Vietnam's Council of Notables failed to draw his fire.


On 31 December, however, Sihanouk renewed a threat to rupture all relations with the United States unless Washington apologizes for US representations over Cambodian slurs against President Kennedy. He also has demanded such apologies as a precondition for accepting the Philippines' offer to mediate Cambodian-US differences.

Sihanouk may be trying new tactics to advance his arguments for neutralization of Southeast Asia. Broadcasts purporting to be the "voices" of movements for neutralism and nationalism in South Vietnam and Thailand were heard in the area for the first time on 29 December. While these broadcasts could be a Viet Cong effort, they are on frequencies close to those normally used by the Cambodian radio, have used primarily the Cambodian language, and follow closely Sihanouk's line of argumentation.

Sihanouk meanwhile is trying to cope with the consequences of his nationalization program and of his termination of US aid. He is stumping the countryside on behalf of his policies, extolling the virtues of thrift, hard work, and independence of the US. While he probably will rally popular support, apprehensions in business circles are not likely to be allayed without some concessions. Economic activity already was depressed before export-import firms were nationalized on 1 January. The adoption of a measure allowing for "poorly managed" government enterprises to be turned over to industrialists may be an effort to regain the confidence of the business community.

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Asia-Africa

**KENYA COMBATS SOMALI INSURGENCY**

Continued Somali incursions in the first month of Kenya's independence have caused Prime Minister Kenyatta to take increasingly forceful measures.

For two months, groups of armed Somalis have been conducting well-planned raids into Kenya from safe havens in the Somali Republic. The boldest attack to date was a 50-man raid on Christmas Day against a police post some 80 miles inside Kenya. The aim of these raids is to give support to the secession efforts of the predominantly Somali inhabitants of Kenya's desert-like Northeastern Region.

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Kenyatta appears convinced of Mogadiscio's involvement. His talks with Somali Foreign Minister Issa during the mid-December independence celebrations brought a suspension of Mogadiscio's vitriolic propaganda broadcasts, but Kenyatta has apparently concluded that more decisive action is needed now.

On 25 December Kenyatta proclaimed a state of emergency

in the region, and prohibited residence within a five-mile-wide zone along the 450-mile Somali border. He is expected soon to augment the 1,100 troops and police in the region. Effective control will be difficult, however, take time, and siphon off the new country's energies and resources.

Kenyatta may also be preparing to implement a mutual defense pact with Ethiopia, secretly concluded last June and formalized last week. The pact is aimed at containing Somali insurgency in both countries. An Ethiopian mission including several high-ranking military officers flew to Nairobi on 28 December.

Militant actions are likely to evoke a harsh response from the Somali Government, which is under domestic pressure to give greater support to the guerrillas. The US Embassy in Mogadiscio thinks that the Somali Government may not be giving as much assistance to the dissidents as Kenyatta believes. Prime Minister Abdirasid, however, is faced with mounting criticism within his own party and difficult general elections in March, and may feel compelled to bolster his waning prestige by identifying himself more closely with the emotional issue of Somali irredentism. 25X1

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Asia-Africa

AREA NOTE:

25X1 Yemen: Anti-Egyptian feeling within the Yemeni republican regime continues to grow. Since Cairo first sent troops to Yemen, the Egyptians have been encroaching on Yemeni governmental prerogatives. In mid-December the entire presidential and executive councils resigned [redacted]

[redacted] These Yemeni officials are still carrying out their duties, however, and no open rebellion against Egyptian authority appears in prospect.

Some important supporters of the republic along with their

their tribal followers may nevertheless defect to the pro-royalist northern tribes.


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Shortly before the latest extension of the UN Observer Mission's mandate was to expire on 4 January, both Nasir and Saudi Crown Prince Faysal agreed to another two-month extension. [redacted]

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ANTONIO SEGNI  
President of the Italian Republic

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He was born on 2 February 1891 in Sassari, Sardinia. Son of a wealthy land-owning family, he studied law and became a professor. He was active in the Popular Party, predecessor of today's Christian Democrats, in the pre-Fascist era, but dropped out of politics during the Mussolini dictatorship.

Segni's career since the Duce's fall:

1944-1946:	Undersecretary of Agriculture
1947-1951:	Minister of Agriculture
1953-1954:	Minister of Education
July 1955-	
May 1957:	Premier
July 1958-	
Jan 1959:	Vice Premier, Defense Minister
Feb 1959-	
Mar 1960:	Premier
July 1960-	
Feb 1962:	Foreign Minister
May 1962:	Elected President of Italy

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Europe

# PRESIDENT SEGNI OF ITALY TO VISIT WASHINGTON

President Segni, who will visit Washington on 14-15 January, is a strong advocate of Italy's adherence to NATO and agrees with US foreign policy objectives. He has, however, deep reservations on the new center-left government of Aldo Moro, and will probably urge US officials to take a cautious attitude toward it.

As did his predecessor Gronchi, Segni has sought to expand the powers and prestige of Italy's figurehead presidency. He paid a state visit to West Germany last summer, and he is due to visit France late next month.

He also maintains an active interest in the affairs of the Christian Democratic (CD) party. He is associated with the large center faction, but his personal political outlook is closer to that of the right wing. He is said to be on particularly close terms with Treasury Minister Colombo and the new CD party secretary, Mariano Rumor. While he accepts the need for gradual social and economic reform, he opposes some of the major changes envisaged in the coalition program, particularly with respect to agriculture and economic planning.

Segni appears to be convinced that the participation of the Socialists (PSI) in the government presents a "dangerous" innovation which will work to the advantage of the Communists and undermine the economy. He made a strenuous behind-the-scenes effort to prevent the formation of the Moro government.

Although he may feel somewhat reassured by Nenni's firm stand against the pro-Communists in the Socialist Party, Segni still retains an acute distaste for the new government's program. If the occasion arises, he probably will not hesitate to use his influence--both as President and as Chairman of the National Defense Council--to try to topple Moro.

In any event, Segni can be expected to try to delay any legislation which he may consider too "leftist." He will probably encourage his CD party friends to try to take advantage of dissension in the Socialist Party to try to water down the government's commitments.

Segni sees the MLF as a way to strengthen the NATO alliance and also to enhance Italian prestige. He tried to use PSI opposition to further MLF commitments at this time as an issue to disrupt the negotiations to form a government. At the time he went so far as to send word to the PSI that the US was pressing for a definite MLF commitment "now." Segni might exploit this issue again to strain the coalition, and will probably repeat in his Washington talks that Italy views the proposal very favorably.

Foreign Minister Saragat, who will accompany Segni, is equally devoted to a strong pro-US and pro-NATO foreign policy, but is a firm supporter of the center-left government, which he helped organize.

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Europe

**EUROPEAN FISHERIES CONFERENCE**

The 16-nation European Fisheries Conference, which recessed on 6 December with major issues unresolved, reconvenes in London on 8 January. While there is general agreement among the participants on the need for a modern fishing code, they have shown little inclination to compromise their differences on the extent of offshore fishing rights. Whether or not an agreement is reached, pressure to extend territorial waters along with fishing rights is likely to continue, despite US preference for the status quo.

The question of fishing limits in the North Atlantic area has been in dispute off and on for some years. The two Geneva conferences on the law of the sea in 1958 and 1960 produced no agreement on fishing rights. Between 1958 and 1961, the "cod war" resulted in several incidents between British naval patrols and Icelandic gunboats enforcing a 12-mile limit.

In March 1961, however, the UK and Iceland reached a settlement which acknowledged the Icelandic 12-mile fisheries limit but permitted British trawlers--for the ensuing three years--to fish at specified times in limited areas between the six- and twelve-mile lines. Since that time London has been pressing for an extension and for relaxation of the restrictions on time and area.

Of the many proposals on the subject presented at the December session of the fisheries conference, only those of the British and Belgians were accepted for further discussion. London's proposition provides for a fishing jurisdiction of 12 miles--the first six to be exclusively reserved to domestic fishers; the remaining six to be shared with countries "traditionally fishing in the area over the last five years." The Belgian idea would set a territorial waters limit of three miles, but push reserved fishing areas out an additional nine miles. Access to the supplementary fishing area would be granted to contracting parties of the proposed agreement "having traditional fishing rights."

While the British are flexible on mileage, they are insisting on uniformity. If the conference fails to reach agreement on a single rule, however, the government intends unilaterally to proclaim mileage limits for the UK. This proclamation would probably be in keeping with the limits already adopted by many other maritime nations--that is, territorial waters extending six miles to sea and exclusive fishing rights going out another six. These new limits would go into effect after 23 June 1964, by which time Britain will have withdrawn from both the North Atlantic Fisheries Convention of 1882 and the Fisheries Regulation of 1843 which set the present limits.

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Western Hemisphere

**POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN PANAMA**

The candidacy of Arnulfo Arias promises to make Panama's national election this May the liveliest in the country's recent history. Arias' bid to regain the presidency has created uncertainty within both of Panama's principal political coalitions, and it could upset the carefully contrived political deals of the other leading candidates.

Panamanian politicians fear that Arias--ousted from the presidency after brief service in 1941 and again in 1951--still has strong demagogic appeal among lower income groups in Panama. They regard Arias, member of one of the country's wealthiest and most powerful families, as [redacted]

[redacted] a political lone wolf. Although he does not at present control a cohesive political organization, his enemies fear that his legendary personal force and charm will make up for this deficiency.

[redacted] 25X1

A major obstacle for Arias is the deep-seated enmity between him and the Panamanian National Guard, the country's only armed force. The national guard and its top officers are closely identified with Panama's traditional politico-economic structure and its controlling elite, which includes the individuals and parties composing both the OA and the government coalition. These elements are disturbed by Arias' mass appeal and by his recent statement that the US presence in the Canal Zone should not be made a campaign issue. 25X6 25X6

[redacted] 25X1

Both government and pro-Communist groups hope to obtain political advantage out of the present proliferation of political parties and candidates for the presidency and the legislature. The scramble among 19 legally registered parties to elect deputies to the 42-member unicameral legislature is causing increasing confusion. In this atmosphere, an aggressive campaign by Arias could create an explosive situation. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

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Western Hemisphere

AREA NOTE

Castroite Meetings in Latin America: Three Cuba-sponsored hemisphere meetings are scheduled to take place in the next few months. The long-delayed organizing congress of the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL) is to be held from 24-28 January in Brazil. The other conferences are the second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC), planned for Santiago, Chile in March, and the Continental Commission of Solidarity with Cuba. The latter organization is likely to meet in Havana next month

If held, the CUTAL meeting will be the climax of a sustained

Cuban effort to establish a hemisphere-wide labor organization which would serve as a platform for propagating Castroism throughout Latin America. One of the items high on the congress' agenda is a call for endorsing "the defense of the Cuban revolution." How much support such a proposal will receive is uncertain, however, because some participating labor organizations are unenthusiastic about tying CUTAL too closely to Cuba.

The youth meeting also will probably adopt resolutions calling for solidarity with Cuba. The LAYC meeting was originally scheduled for Santiago in August 1963, but was postponed because of organizational problems.

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